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Abstract
Cash- and stock-financed takeover bids induce strikingly different target revaluations. We
exploit detailed data on unsuccessful takeover bids between 1980 and 2008, and we show
that targets of cash offers are revalued on average by +15% after deal failure, whereas
stock targets return to their pre-announcement levels. The differences in revaluation do
not revert over longer horizons. We find no evidence that future takeover activities or
operational changes explain these differences. While the targets of failed cash and stock
offers are both more likely to be acquired over the following eight years than matched
control firms, no differences exist between cash and stock targets, neither in the timing
nor in the value of future offers. Similarly, we cannot detect differential operational
policies following the failed bid. Our results are most consistent with cash bids revealing
prior undervaluation of the target. We reconcile our findings with the opposite conclusion
in earlier literature (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1983) by identifying a look-ahead bias built
into their sample construction.
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1. Introduction
Takeovers are among the largest and most disruptive events in a corporation’s lifetime.
The proper assessment of their value implications has been of foremost interest to policy
makers and academic researchers alike. One set of stylized facts that the literature has
been wrestling to explain is the large difference in returns of cash- and stock-financed
takeovers, as well as the different motives of acquirers for choosing one type of payment
over the other [see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (2003); Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2004); Fishman (1989)]. Announcement returns of cash deals are consistently found to
be higher than those of stock deals, both in the short run (Huang and Walkling, 1987)
and in the long run (Loughran and Vijh, 1997) and not only for the acquirer but also for
the target (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001).1
The correct interpretation of the return differences between cash and stock bids de-
pends on the underlying information the market responds to [see, for instance, Bradley,
Desai, and Kim (1983)]. A bid could reveal information about the value implications
of the takeover, e.g., match-specific synergies reaped by the acquirer or the size of the
premium paid to target shareholders. A bid could also reveal information about value
implications that are independent of the specific takeover, e.g., information about the
parties’ stand-alone values or about the target firm’s general attractiveness as a takeover
target. As Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah (2005) argue, disentangling these nonex-
clusive sources is a first-order building block in estimating the real value created by
mergers and acquisitions.
Our paper contributes to this debate by identifying and quantifying the economic rel-
evance of the different channels in the context of failed takeover attempts. The difference
in valuations before bid announcement and after bid failure allows us to separate out the
value implications of the takeover itself and to estimate the extent to which firms are
revalued in response to the bid, independent of the completion of the takeover. Focusing
on the target, we then go one step further and distinguish between revaluation due to ex-
pected future takeover activity (i.e., the target firm’s general attractiveness as a takeover
target) and revaluation of the target’s stand-alone value.
For our empirical analysis, we collect a detailed data set on unsuccessful merger bids
and tender offers in the US between 1980 and 2008, including hand-collected information
about the failure reasons. We show that, on average, targets of cash offers are revalued by
+15%, but there is no revaluation of stock targets.2 After an initial announcement effect
1 See also the overview paper by Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008).
2 We also show that, consistent with previous studies, stock acquirers trade on average at significantly
lower prices post failure (−17.6%), while cash acquirers remain at their pre-announcement level. See
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(including the 25 trading-day run-up) of +25% for cash targets and +15% for stock
targets, the value of the average cash target remains at +15% cumulative abnormal
returns (CAR) at the time of deal failure, relative to the pre-announcement level, while
the CAR of stock targets is statistically insignificant (with a slightly negative point
estimate).3 These results hold controlling for a host of deal- and firm-level characteristics,
including target size, relative deal size, offer premium, hostility, and deal form (tender
offer versus merger). We also show that this difference persists in the long run. Over
the next five years after failure of the bid, targets of cash and stock offers do not exhibit
abnormal stock market performance.
Because deal failure is not exogenous, we cannot easily generalize our findings beyond
the sample of failed deals. The issue is not that deals that ultimately fail are different
from deals that do not fail. Common deal-failure bias would not affect the differential
revaluation of cash and stock targets. If, hypothetically, revaluations were lower in failed
than in completed transactions by a common percentage for both cash and stock deals,
the revaluation difference between cash and stock deals in the sample of failed bids would
be representative of that in the full sample. Instead, the concern is a more subtle selection
bias, namely that selection into bid failure differs between cash and stock targets.
We address the concern of differential sample-selection bias following the approach of
Savor and Lu (2009). We classify failure reasons for failed deals into categories such as
regulatory intervention, negative shocks to the bidder, or uncovering of new information
about the target post announcement of the bid. Based on our hand-collected news-search
analysis and detailed categorization of failure reasons, we replicate our analysis for each
of the 12 identified failure categories. We find that the cash-stock revaluation difference
for targets is positive in every category other than failure due to market-wide shocks,
although the statistical significance naturally varies given the small subsamples.
Such categorization involves an inevitable amount of judgment, and none of the failure
categories can be definitely established as exogenous to target value as convincingly as in
a randomized experiment. However, endogeneity concerns (with respect to target value)
should be less relevant for deals that failed due to regulatory intervention or negative
shocks to the bidder compared with bids that failed because of negative shocks to the
target, such as the uncovering of accounting fraud in the due diligence process. Based on
the extent of such endogeneity concerns, we then aggregate deal-failure categories into
larger subsamples. Our results are robust, regardless of variations in how exactly we
form these subsamples.
To investigate the source of revaluation, we first test whether future takeover bids
explain our findings. Do targets of (failed) cash bids receive significantly more or signifi-
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006)
for similar findings on acquirers. Savor and Lu (2009) compare unsuccessful and successful bids, and
they find that unsuccessful stock acquirers perform worse.
3 The announcement effect estimates are almost identical to those found by Huang and Walkling
(1987) in their sample of successful and unsuccessful deals, +29.3% for cash and +14.4% for stock deals,
suggesting that the market assesses (eventually) failed deals to be similar ex ante.
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cantly higher future bids than stock targets? For each target of a failed deal, we measure
the time from the date of deal failure until the arrival of a future successful offer (or the
censoring event determined by the data sample). Employing hazard-rate models, we find
that both cash and stock targets are significantly more likely to be targeted in subsequent
offers, compared with a sample of matched control firms. For example, after five years,
50% of the targets with failed bids have received a successful bid, compared with 20%
in the control group. The abnormally high subsequent takeover activity persists until
eight years after deal failure. However, comparing targets of unsuccessful cash and stock
bids with each other, we do not detect any differences in frequency. Similarly, we do not
detect any differences in future takeover premia in the subsample of targets that receive
a successful follow-up bid, though the statistical power of the latter analysis is low.
Another plausible explanation is that bids induce value-increasing operational policy
changes. This catalyst channel could explain our results if targets of failed cash bids re-
sponded more than targets of failed stock bids. However, employing operational outcome
variables used by Safieddine and Titman (1999), we do not find any robust evidence for
differential post-failure policies.
In a nutshell, our paper, first, finds significant differential revaluation of cash and
stock targets in failed takeover bids. By construction, such revaluation is independent
of the value created by the intended takeover. Second, the differential revaluation is
explained neither by future takeovers nor by common proxies of operational change. Our
evidence is most consistent with a differential reassessment of cash and stock targets, i.e.,
a pure informational channel. At the same time, our results do not indicate the absence of
synergies or operational improvements as a result of takeover bids. Instead, our empirical
approach of comparing cash and stock targets of failed bids is specifically designed to
isolate information effects. We exploit that cash and stock targets are similar in that they
are both exposed to a failed takeover, allowing us to difference out any associated real
effects while identifying the differential information content embedded in the medium of
exchange. Thus, our empirical results should be interpreted as ruling in the possibility
of significant information effects, which contrasts with the previous literature.
Contribution to literature. Our paper relates to an earlier literature on mergers and
acquisitions exploiting bid failure. Dodd and Ruback (1977) find a large revaluation of
targets after failed tender offers. Dodd (1980) compares revaluations of target firms that
vetoed the bid with those that did not. He finds that only target firms with management
that opposed the bid are positively revalued. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) analyze
the role of future bids. They compare target firms that are taken over within five years
following the initial (failed) tender offer with firms that are not. They report that firms
without a subsequent takeover offer exhibit negative abnormal returns after deal failure
and return to pre-offer valuations. The CAR point estimate from one month prior to
announcement of the original bid until five years after the announcement is virtually
zero, namely −1.07%. They conclude that “the gains to the stockholders of unsuccessful
targets stem from the anticipation of a future successful acquisition and not simply from
the revelation of new information regarding the ‘true’ value of the target resources.”
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The conclusion of this seminal paper has remained the presumed status quo in the
literature [see Davidson, Dutia, and Cheng (1989) and Fabozzi, Ferri, Fabozzi, and Tucker
(1988) for follow-up studies on merger bids and tender offers, respectively]. Our findings
suggest that the evidence in these studies needs to be reinterpreted. We argue that
forward-looking sample construction biases the returns of firms without future takeover
activity downward. The magnitude of this bias is economically significant. We show that
matched control firms are taken over about 20% of the time in a span of five years. This
amount of future takeover activity should also be priced in the stock market valuation
of actual targets prior to the announcement of the (initial) takeover offer. Conditioning
on the absence of takeover activity for five years after deal failure therefore induces a
negative look-ahead bias of about 20% of the typical takeover premium. Using the average
historical premium of 46.2% (cf. Panel A of Table 1), a back-of-the-envelope calculation
(ignoring discounting) suggests that the magnitude of this bias is roughly 46.2% · 0.2 ≈
9%. Because Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) find that targets in their sample (almost
exactly) return to pre-announcement levels despite this bias, their empirical results are
consistent with a positive (offsetting) informational effect of the failed bid. Therefore,
their conclusion of ruling out information effects might not be warranted based on their
own evidence.
The issue of forward-looking sample selection implies that the point estimate of the
long-run CAR is a (downward-)biased measure of the informational effect of a bid, as the
estimation conditions on the absence of future bids. A separate, more general concern
is the precision of long-run CAR estimates, which affects all studies calculating long-run
returns. Because the standard error of the CAR grows with the square root of the return
horizon (e.g., Fama, 1998), a one-time event triggering a significant short-run effect in the
range of 10—20% is unlikely to be detected over a five-year horizon. Concretely, in the
sample of Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983), the standard error of the CAR estimate for
the window from one month before the bid until 60 months after the bid is economically
large at 15.37%.4 As a result, even after correcting the CAR estimate of −1.07% for
a look-ahead bias of 9%, a long-run returns analysis would not allow us to reject the
existence of any informational effect of a takeover bid between [−22%,+38%] at the 5%
level. We conclude that the noise inherent in long-run CARs clouds the ability to make
precise quantitative assessments of the informational effect.5
The empirical approach proposed in this paper, i.e., the comparison of cash and stock
targets at announcement and failure, addresses both issues. First, forming comparison
groups based on the medium of exchange does not introduce a look-ahead bias, as the
choice of cash versus stock is already publicly known at the time of the announcement.
Second, our main CAR estimates are orders of magnitude more precise than above-
4 The monthly standard error of 1.952% (see Table 3 in Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1983) implies that
the standard error of the long-run CAR from one month before the bid until 60 months after the bid is√
62 · 1.952% = 15.37%.
5 In the Online Appendix, we calculate long-run returns in the spirit of Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983)
using our larger sample and employing a calendar-time portfolio approach. Our results are subject to
noise concerns of similar magnitude.
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mentioned long-run returns calculations, because the average time from announcement
to failure is 60 days in our sample. Concerns about noise in long-run returns calculations
do affect our additional analysis of the value of future bids due to the longer period
between the initial bid and the subsequent bid. However, in the complementary analysis
of the likelihood of a future bid, a longer observation horizon allows us to estimate hazard
rates more precisely.
The results in our paper are consistent with earlier evidence by Sullivan, Jensen,
and Hudson (1994).6 Our paper is also closely related to Savor and Lu (2009), whose
classification of failure reasons we implement. Different from our approach, they use
this classification to compare successful and failed bids. In a similar spirit, Malmendier,
Moretti, and Peters (2010) assess the long-run returns to takeovers by comparing the
returns of competing bidders in contested takeovers. They find that winners of (long-
duration) bidding contests under-perform losers in the long run.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our
data and explain our sample selection. Section 3 presents all empirical results. Section 4
concludes.
2. Data
We collect data on failed merger bids and tender offers in the US between 1980 and
2008 from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database, and
we merge the data with stock market and accounting data from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat. To research failure reasons, we run a news
search in LexisNexis and use the deal synopses provided by SDC.
Our initial sample contains all bids with sufficient information for a basic analysis
of the relation between the medium of exchange and target revaluation. That is, first,
we require a valid announcement date and a valid completion or failure date within five
to 250 trading days after the announcement.7 Second, we exclude bids with competing
offers, i.e., offers that are announced before failure of the initial bid, to avoid capturing
returns to the competing offer.8 Third, to ensure meaningful ownership changes, we drop
targets of which less than 50% was publicly traded before the takeover bid. Fourth,
we require a match in the merged CRSP/Compustat database.9 Fifth, our analysis
6 Sullivan, Jensen, and Hudson (1994) is based on a very small sample (36 observations, 66 without
controls), lacks essential control variables (such as hostility, offer premium, market-to-book ratio, or
other valuation measures), and does not include tender offers.
7 We impose an upper bound on the days post announcement to avoid capturing information that is
unrelated to the offer. None of our results depends on this bound, which affects 5% of the sample.
8 We correct some of the competing-bid information in SDC based on our news search in LexisNexis.
As a robustness check, we have included targets with competing bids in a previous version of the paper.
The results with regard to the medium of exchange are robust.
9 We use the six-digit CUSIP provided in the SDC database to merge the data. When matched with
more than one CRSP CUSIP, we choose the CUSIP with the lowest seventh digit (typically 1).
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requires information about the medium of exchange (cash, stock, or other) and the deal
premium. We extrapolate missing deal premia by regressing the available SDC premia on
transaction values divided by the target’s market capitalization 25 days prior to the bid,
and we predict out-of-sample premia based on transaction value and market capitalization
(when available). Following Officer (2003), we truncate deal premia below zero and
above 200%. Sixth, target stock market data need to be available 25 days prior to
announcement until 25 days post failure. The use of 25 days for the run-up period is
motivated by the finding of Schwert (1996) that run-ups do not occur until 21 days before
the announcement. The resulting initial data set consists of 969 failed bids.
For our main analysis, we impose three further restrictions. First, we eliminate lever-
aged buyouts (LBOs), most notably buyouts by target management, given that the in-
formation revealed naturally differs from transactions with third-party bidders, leaving
809 deals.10 Second, to rule out other factors that are correlated with the choice of cash
versus stock, we require information about hostile bids, deal form (tender offer versus
merger), market value of equity, and target q ratios (market value of equity plus assets
minus the book value of equity, all divided by assets). This reduces our sample to 675
deals of which 518 deals are pure-cash or pure-stock deals (henceforth pure deals). This
constitutes our large sample. Third, we account for the fact that only public acquirers
have a meaningful choice between cash and stock financing and, thus, restrict our sample
to public-to-public transactions, which allows us to control for the relative deal size, i.e.,
the ratio of the transaction value over the market value of the acquirer’s equity, as well as
the acquirer’s q ratio. The resulting data set constitutes our main sample. It consists of
236 unsuccessful takeover bids (183 pure deals). The corresponding sample of successful
bids amounts to 1,846 observations (1,268 of which are pure), implying that roughly one-
eighth of all deals are unsuccessful. The last restriction focuses our sample on larger and
economically important acquisitions, similar to the sample of Healy, Palepu, and Ruback
(1992), which is also a prerequisite for obtaining detailed information on failure reasons
in our news-search analysis. However, our main results also hold in the large sample of
675 deals.11
Summary statistics. The summary statistics for the main sample are in Panel A of
Table 1, separately for successful and unsuccessful bids. Successful and unsuccessful deals
in our sample are remarkably similar along many dimensions, including the percentage
of cash payment offered, transaction value, relative deal size, and offer premium. They
differ in the percentage of stock and other payment offered, with less stock and more
other payments in successful deals. We also see that deals take longer to be completed
than to be withdrawn or rejected. Successful bids are less likely to be hostile, and more
likely to be tender offers, than unsuccessful bids. They also feature a higher fraction of
experienced bidders. Finally, a marginally significant difference exists in the q ratio of
the target, which is higher among successful bids. There are no significant differences,
10 We thank Harry DeAngelo, our referee, for pointing this out. All results are robust to including
LBOs.
11 See, in particular, Appendix Table B.3.
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however, in the q ratio of the acquirer or in the proportion of bids for which the acquirer’s
q is greater than the target’s q.
[Insert Table 1 near here.]
Panel B of Table 1 provides more details on pure deals within the subsample of
unsuccessful bids.12 These deals make up roughly four-fifths of the main sample. There
are only few significant differences between cash and stock transactions. Cash deals are
more likely to be hostile or tender offers, and both bidders and targets have lower q
ratios. There are no significant differences in the acquirer-to-target q ratios.
Failure reasons. We categorize the reasons for bid failure based on a detailed news
search in LexisNexis and on the deal synopses in SDC. Table 2 shows the main cat-
egories. The first five categories summarize cases in which the deal failed due to a
negative response of the target to the bid or due to (typically negative) news about
the target. “Price too low” indicates that the parties could not agree on the transac-
tion price. “Management rejection” indicates that the target management prevented the
takeover, for example by adopting poison pills, by repurchasing shares from the bidder
(greenmail), or by deliberately breaching merger covenants. “Shareholder rejection” in-
dicates rejection by shareholders, e.g., leading to an insufficient number of shares being
tendered. “Target news (public)” refers to failed deals associated with (typically bad)
public news about the target.13 “Target problems (private)” refers to failed deals in
which the acquirer discovered bad information in the due diligence process.
[Insert Table 2 near here.]
The next two categories summarize reasons that likely affect both the target and the
acquirer. “Market problems” summarizes failures due to market-wide downturns, mostly
the October 1987 crash, September 11, and the subprime crisis. “Industry problems” are
industry-wide shocks such as adverse oil price developments for oil companies.
The next four categories are all cases in which the endogeneity of failure with respect
to target value should be less of a concern. “Regulator” refers to lack of regulatory ap-
proval as revealed by our news search or the SDC data. For example, General Electric’s
proposed acquisition of Honeywell in October 2000 was blocked by the European Com-
mission, in a decision that deviated from the US Department of Justice’s view. “Man-
agement terms” refers to cases in which target management and acquirer management
could not agree on organizational issues, such as the nomination of a Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of the future company. “Bidder problems” summarizes failures due to
financing problems on the part of the bidder or other negative news about its business.
12 For completeness, we also show the characteristics of successful pure deals in Appendix Table B.1.
13 One deal in our sample failed due to positive news about the target. In August 1996, US Diagnostic
Labs called off the acquisition of Alliance Imaging because of a run-up in Alliance’s stock price.
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“Bidder acquired” are sudden cancelations because the bidder itself became the target
of an acquisition.
Lastly, the stand-alone category “Alliance” denotes cases in which the bidder and the
target entered into another type of cooperation, instead of the takeover. We were unable
to retrieve any information about the failure reason for 35 of 236 deals, and we had no
information beyond which party canceled the takeover for another 51 deals.
We use this categorization of failure reasons to form two subsamples for which en-
dogenous selection (with respect to target value) should be less of a concern. First, we
denote as sample N the subset of deals excluding bids whose failure was clearly endoge-
nous to the target’s value or related to extreme market volatility, namely the categories
“Target news (public),” “Target problems (private),”“Market problems,”and “Industry
problems.” Second, we consider a more conservative sample C, which contains only those
deals for which we identify a failure reason that is most likely unrelated to the target’s
value: regulatory intervention (“Regulator”), unexpected issues on the side of the bidder
(“Bidder problems” and “Bidder acquired”), and disagreement on management terms or
positions (“Management terms”).
3. Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we establish the revaluation dif-
ference between cash and stock deals—both in the raw data and in a controlled regression
framework—and show its long-run persistence. Second, we test whether the differential
revaluation of cash and stock targets can be explained by differences in future takeover
activity or differences in subsequent operational policies.
3.1. Revaluation
To evaluate revaluation differences in the short run, we examine target returns from
25 trading days pre announcement to 25 trading days post failure. The choice of 25
days is motivated by the findings of Schwert (1996) on pre-bid run-ups. We calculate
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as:
CARit =
t∑
j=1
(rij − rmj) , (1)
where rij and rmj denote firm i’s equity return and the CRSP value-weighted market
return at time j, respectively.14 Note that cumulative abnormal returns can be compared
across deals with different window lengths from bid to failure as long as the underlying
14 We follow the literature in using equity market values. Ideally, one would use enterprise values,
i.e., include the market values of debt, but it is difficult to obtain daily market values of debt. Our
approximation mistakes are likely of second order because debt is less sensitive to information.
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equilibrium asset pricing model is correctly specified. Moreover, in our analysis, any such
model misspecification is likely a second-order concern due to the relatively short length
of the event window.15
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Fig. 1. Announcement effects at bid and at failure (+/− 25 days). The figure depicts cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) from 25 trading days before announcement of the initial bid (B) to 25 trading
days after deal failure (F). The sample consists of 81 pure-cash and 102 pure-stock deals (see summary
statistics in Panel B of Table 1).
Univariate results. Fig. 1 previews our first key empirical result. It plots the evolution
of cumulative abnormal returns from 25 trading days prior to the announcement to 25
trading days after failure, separately for pure-cash and pure-stock bids and both for
targets and for acquirers. The graph illustrates three sets of raw empirical findings. The
left part of the graph, from B− 25 to B + 1, indicates the average announcement return
to the bid, including the run-up period (as in Asquith, 1983). The right part of the
graph, from F − 1 to F + 25, captures the announcement return to bid failure. The
middle part, from B + 1 to F − 1, captures the returns during the intermediate period
between announcement and failure. For the illustration of the intermediate period, we
normalize trading days (in percent) because the time from bid announcement to failure
differs across deals. We linearly interpolate between trading days if needed [see Appendix
Section A.1 for details]. For example, 50% refers to trading day 50 if a bid fails after one
hundred trading days, but it refers to trading day 20 if a bid fails after 40 trading days.
The intermediate returns reflect continuous updating about the probability of failure, in
addition to changes of the valuation conditional on success and failure, respectively.
15 See, among others, Barber and Lyon (1997), Fama (1998), and Brav (2000) on the statistical
concerns affecting the calculation of long-run abnormal returns.
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We observe strong cumulative announcement returns to targets of both cash and
stock offers, of 25% and 15% on average, respectively. These magnitudes are very similar
to those estimated by Huang and Walkling (1987) in their earlier sample of cash and
stock bids, which also include successful bids. Thus, the market assesses (eventually)
failed deals to be similar ex ante. At the time of deal failure, however, the value of stock
targets falls slightly below the pre-announcement level, to which it ultimately returns.
The value of cash targets, instead, remains significantly higher. The typical cash target
features cumulative abnormal returns of 15% relative to pre-announcement. Despite a
small upward trend for both cash and stock targets after deal failure, stock targets remain
on average more than 15% below cash targets.
For completeness, the graph also plots the corresponding acquirer returns. Stock
acquirers trade on average at significantly lower prices post failure (−17.6%), whereas
the typical cash acquirer is not revalued significantly.
Next, we test whether the 15% revaluation difference between cash and stock targets
reverts or whether it persists over longer horizons. We estimate the long-run abnormal
performance of targets in the post-failure period over various horizons up to five years.
Due to the significantly longer horizon, we can no longer rely on the simple abnormal-
return calculations shown in Eq. (1). Instead, we adopt the calendar-time portfolio
approach advocated by Fama (1998) [see also earlier work by Jaffe (1974), and Mandelker
(1974)] to account for the cross-sectional correlation between target firms. For each
month from January 1980 until December 2008, we form an equal-weight portfolio of all
firms that received an unsuccessful cash or stock offer in the previous m months, where
m ∈ {12, 24, 36, 48, 60}. For example, medical device company Cyberonics received a
cash offer by St. Jude Medical in April 1996 that was withdrawn in October 1996.
Upon deal failure, Cyberonics was in the 60-month cash portfolio between November
1996 and October 2001. We then calculate the alphas of the respective cash and stock
portfolios, as well as the long-short (cash minus stock) portfolio in time series regressions
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as the underlying asset pricing model.16
Because the number of firms in the portfolios is time-varying, we efficiently estimate the
coefficients by weighted least squares (see Appendix Section A.2 for details). One would
not expect to see abnormal post-failure returns in an efficient market, as this portfolio
strategy can be implemented without forward-looking information.
Table 3 presents our results on long-run post-failure returns. Note that the alpha
estimate of the long-short portfolio is generally not the difference between the respective
cash and stock alphas, as a monthly observation is included only if both the cash and
the stock portfolio are nonempty. We find that, for both the main sample and the large
sample, all portfolio alphas (cash, stock, long-short) are insignificant for each horizon m.
Hence, we do not find evidence that the revaluation difference between cash and stock
targets reverses in the long run.
[Insert Table 3 near here.]
16 All of our results are robust to using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.
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Multivariate regression analysis. Next, we return to our chosen event-study window
(B − 25, F + 25) and estimate revaluation differences in a controlled regression frame-
work. In this manner, we test whether revaluation differences between cash and stock
targets reflect other observable deal- or entity-specific characteristics such as hostility,
tender offers, or relative deal size.
The multivariate regression analysis is presented in Table 4. As a benchmark, we first
regress the target CAR on the fraction of cash offered without further controls. This
replicates the graphical evidence and provides robust standard errors. We estimate a
cash coefficient of 22.4% in the main sample (Column 1) and 22.1% in the pure-deals
sample (not shown in the table). Both estimates are significant at the 1% level.
[Insert Table 4 near here.]
In Columns 2 and 3, we add control variables for deal- and entity-specific charac-
teristics that are correlated with the medium of exchange and could reflect the target’s
stand-alone value: relative deal size, acquirer q, and target q (which correlate negatively
with the use of cash), as well as dummies for hostile and tender bids (which both cor-
relate positively with the use of cash).17 Including such controls is important because
Jensen and Ruback (1983) find that only targets in unsuccessful tender offers are pos-
itively revalued. In addition, we control for target size, offer premium, industry fixed
effects, and year fixed effects. Note that the industry and year fixed effects should also
mitigate confounds with accounting rule changes, such as Statement 142 of the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) abolishing the pooling-of-interests method in
2001.18
After including these controls, the cash coefficient remains similar: 19.9% in the main
sample (Column 2) and 22.6% in the pure-deals sample (Column 3). The analysis also
reveals that, in addition to the medium of exchange, deal premia correlate strongly with
target CARs. Intuitively, the more the bidder is willing to pay, the higher is the market
revaluation. We also find that smaller targets are revalued more, possibly reflecting that
a bid conveys more new information to the market if the target is small.
The cash effect is also present in the large sample of 675 bids, which includes nonpublic
acquirers (see Appendix Table B.3). The point estimates become somewhat smaller
17 See Appendix Table B.2 for an analysis of the correlates of the medium of exchange.
18 FASB Statement 142 requires acquirers to record net target assets at their fair value (purchase
method) for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2001. The difference between purchase price and
asset value is allocated to goodwill and amortized over a maximum period of 40 years. Until 2001,
stock acquirers (but not cash acquirers) could also use the pooling-of-interests method and combine
the balance sheets of the merging entities to a consolidated balance sheet. Acquirers often preferred
the pooling-of-interests method to avoid the amortization of goodwill and, thus, future reductions in
reportable earnings [see Aboody, Kasznik, and Williams (2000) and Jennings, LeClere, and Thompson
(2001)], possibly tilting the medium of exchange toward stock. Lys and Vincent (1995) describe an
extreme case—AT&T’s acquisition of NCR—of the bidder’s interest in having the acquisition qualify as
a pooling of interests. In additional regressions (unreported), we include an interaction term between
cash and a dummy for the pre-2002 period but fail to find a significant effect.
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but are still statistically and economically significant. The smaller magnitudes may be
explained by the fact that private acquirers have less of a choice between cash and stock,
making a cash offer a weaker signal of target value.
Endogenous selection into deal failure. So far, we have shown that variables known
at the time of deal announcements do not explain the differential revaluation of cash
targets. A different concern is selection into deal failure, as the choice of cash versus
stock payment could be correlated with deal failure. The summary statistics in Panel A
of Table 1 reveal that the fraction of the total payment offered in cash does not correlate
with deal failure, i.e., the fraction of cash offered in successful deals (45.93%) is very
similar to that in unsuccessful deals (44.03%). However, revaluation differences between
cash and stock targets still could be driven by differential sorting of cash and stock
deals into failure. For example, good news about the target could make cash deals, but
not stock deals, more likely to fail because a financially constrained bidder is unable to
increase the bid in cash, leading to overproportional failure of cash bids for targets with
high (re-)valuation.
We have addressed this specific concern in the example above by controlling for finan-
cial constraints of the acquirer [as measured by the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index].
In all specifications based on Table 4, the coefficients on the KZ index as well as its
interactions with cash are insignificant.19 However, even if this specific concern does not
apply, the more general argument remains and can be illustrated as follows. Suppose
that there are only two failure reasons, A and B. Failure reason A is associated with
targets that are revalued by 30%, and failure reason B is associated with targets that are
revalued by −10%, which holds for both cash and stock targets. If 75% of all cash deals,
but only 25% of all stock deals, occur in category A, then one should observe an overall
revaluation effect of 20% for cash deals and 0% for stock deals, even though, within each
category, there is no differential revaluation effect of cash and stock deals.
To address the concern that our differential revaluation estimates could be driven
by specific deal-failure categories, we make use of our hand-collected sample of failure
reasons. We reestimate the cash coefficient for the sample N , described in Section 2,
which excludes bids whose failure was endogenous to the target’s value or caused by
market- or industry-wide problems, which (also) affect the target. The results are shown
in Columns 4 to 6 of Table 4. In all regression specifications, we continue to estimate a
positive cash coefficient, statistically significant and very similar in size to those estimated
for the main sample in Columns 1 to 3.
We also reestimate the cash coefficient for the more conservative sample C. As out-
lined in Section 2, sample C consists only of deals that failed due to regulatory inter-
vention, news about the bidder, or disagreement on management terms. The results are
shown in the second-to-last row of Table 2. Here, the small sample size confines us to a
univariate regression, mirroring Columns 1 and 4 of Table 4. We estimate a very similar
cash coefficient of 19.2%, which is significant at the 5% level. Moreover, as shown in the
19 We omit these results, which are available upon request, for the sake of brevity.
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second column of Table 2, we also reestimate the cash coefficient separately for every
single failure category identified by our news search. We find a positive cash coefficient
for all of the 12 categories except “Market problems,” which reflects that revaluation es-
timates for individual companies during market crashes such as September 11 or October
1987 are extremely volatile, even after adjusting for market returns.
Subject to the caveat that we can address selection based only on publicly available
information, the robustness of our results across failure categories suggests that selection
into deal failure is unlikely to drive the (differential) cash effect on target CARs.
3.2. Possible channels
To understand the source of the revaluation difference between cash and stock targets,
we consider two channels that the literature has deemed important. First, a failed offer
identifies a firm as a likely target of further takeover bids, and the anticipated future
takeover premia lead to revaluation [see Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) and, more
recently, Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012)]. Second, a failed takeover bid could
induce the target management to make operational improvements [see, e.g., Safieddine
and Titman (1999)]. For our purposes, the relevant issue is whether cash and stock deals
are differentially exposed to these channels. Do failed cash bids induce higher future
takeover premia than failed stock bids? Do they prompt better operational changes?
3.2.1. Future takeover activity
To assess the empirical significance of future takeovers for the cash-stock revaluation
difference, we test whether the likelihood and timing of subsequent offers as well as their
value are related to the medium of exchange used in the prior (failed) takeover attempt.
We benchmark the analysis against matched firms that have similar characteristics as
the target firms in our sample but did not receive a bid. We identify these control
firms employing propensity score matching. Within the universe of Compustat firms,
we estimate a fixed effects (conditional) logit model for the event that firm i receives a
takeover offer (successful or not) in year t:
Pr {takeoverit = 1|xi,t−1} = G(β′xi,t−1), (2)
where G(·) denotes the cumulative logistic distribution and xi,t−1 is a vector of control
variables that includes firm i’s q ratio, market capitalization (in 2010 dollars), book
value of total assets (in 2010 dollars), and return on equity (net income over book value
of equity), all measured at the end of year t − 1, as well as industry-year fixed effects
[according to two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes].
We use the predicted probabilities, or propensity scores, from the logit regression to
match each target firm in the sample of failed bids to the control firm with the closest
propensity score in the year of the respective failed bid. In doing so, we limit the set of
potential control firms to those (i) operating in the same industry (according to two-digit
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SIC codes) as the matched target firm and (ii) not having received any publicly disclosed
takeover offer in the previous five years.
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Fig. 2. Kaplan-Meier survival estimator. This graph plots the arrival rates of takeover bids for
sample firms and matched control firms over 20 years after an unsuccessful takeover bid (adjusted for
bankruptcy-induced censoring). For each year, the base is the set of surviving firms, and the event is the
announcement day of an eventually successful takeover bid. The sample consists of all deals in the large
sample (starting January 1985) for which we can identify prior takeover activity. Within this sample of
667 failed bids, there are 348 pure-cash and 164 pure-stock bids. The estimated exponential arrival rate
for matched control firms is 4.1%.
For each failed bid in our sample, we measure the time from deal failure to the
announcement date of an eventually successful bid or, in case the target never receives
a successful takeover bid, the censoring date, which is determined by the minimum of
the target’s bankruptcy date and the last trading day in our data.20 Future successful
bids include returning bidders of an earlier failed deal, although the vast majority are
made by other bidders.21 For control firms, we measure the time to arrival of a successful
takeover bid starting from deal failure of the matched sample firm.
20 We use the following CRSP delisting codes to identify bankruptcy: any type of liquidation (400-
490); price fell below acceptable level; insufficient capital, surplus, and/or equity; insufficient (or non-
compliance with rules of) float or assets; company request, liquidation; bankruptcy, declared insolvent;
delinquent in filing; nonpayment of fees; does not meet exchange’s financial guidelines for continued list-
ing; protection of investors and the public interest; corporate governance violation; and delist required
by Securities Exchange Commission.
21 In Appendix Table B.4, we summarize information on follow-up bids by the same bidder. Successful
takeovers by returning bidders occur on average one and a half years after the original failed bid. Future
unsuccessful bids occur about one and two-thirds years after the original bid.
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Fig. 2 plots the corresponding Kaplan-Meier graphs of future takeovers for sample
firms and matched control firms. Because this step of the analysis does not rely on the
detailed data requirements of our main sample, we make use of our large sample (675
observations), which includes nonpublic acquirers. We eliminate eight observations for
which we cannot verify whether the firm received an offer in the previous five years,
resulting in a sample of 667 failed bids. (The graphs look essentially identical if we
include these eight deals. The graphs also look the same if we use our main, instead of
the large, sample.)
Fig. 2 illustrates several important facts. First, recipients of a previously failed offer
(“Treatment: failed offer”) are significantly more likely to be ultimately taken over than
the control group of firms matched on observable characteristics (“Control: failed offer”).
For example, after five years, 50% of the firms with an initial failed bid have been taken
over, relative to 20% in the control sample. Second, even control firms are taken over at
a high rate, 4.1% per year as determined by exponential fit. Hence, the stock prices of
control firms—and, therefore, also the stock prices of actual target firms just before the
announcement of the (ultimately failed) takeover bid—should reflect substantial expected
future takeover activity and corresponding takeover premia. Third, target firms with a
failed offer exhibit higher takeover activity for a long period, namely over the subsequent
eight years post failure. After eight years, the arrival rate of takeovers is (almost) perfectly
described by an exponential arrival rate of 4.3%, which is very close to the arrival rate
of the matched control firms.
Finally, and of greatest importance to our analysis, Fig. 2 reveals that cash and
stock targets exhibit no differential takeover activity over the next 20 years following
the failed takeover attempt. We verify the lack of statistically significant differences in
Cox proportional-hazard regressions, both for the main sample and for the large sample.
Table 5 reports hazard ratios for the event that the target of a failed bid eventually
receives another, successful takeover offer. Hazard ratios for the cash coefficient in excess
of one indicate by how much the rate of future takeover offers exceeds the rate for stock
targets. As can be seen across all columns of Table 5, targets of failed cash bids are no
more likely to receive future takeover offers than targets of failed stock bids, irrespective
of whether we consider the main sample, the large sample, or the subset of pure deals.
We conclude that cash and stock targets are not subject to differential future takeover
activity in terms of their timing.
[Insert Table 5 near here.]
We now turn to the value of future offers. Even if the frequencies of future bids for
cash and stock targets are not significantly different, the higher revaluation of cash targets
could reflect higher future bids. In Table 6, we relate the dollar value of the next offer to
the medium of exchange in the initial failed offer, controlling for the usual array of firm,
deal, industry and time variables and conditional on the existence of successful future
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takeover attempts.22 We use two alternative measures of target size as control variables,
which allows us to capture two different hypothetical counterfactuals. In Columns 1 and
2, target size is measured as market capitalization one month prior to the failed bid and,
thus, prior to any revaluation induced by the bid. Using this measure of target size, any
difference in future bids, even if proportional to the differential revaluation of cash and
stock targets post failure, is attributed to the original medium of exchange. A caveat of
using the value of the target before the original bid to normalize takeover premia is that
the resulting regression estimates are subject to the usual precision problems of long-run
returns studies [see our discussion of Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) in the introduction].
In Columns 3 and 4, instead, we control for the value of the target one month prior to the
subsequent bid, as motivated by the findings of Schwert (1996). This approach ensures
that stock market noise between announcements does not affect our estimates. In all
specifications, we account for the timing of subsequent takeover bids by controlling for
the time between announcements (in years).
[Insert Table 6 near here.]
In both sets of regressions, the coefficient estimate for cash is insignificant. That is,
regardless of whether we test for differences in bid value relative to the original target
value or relative to its value at the time of the next bid, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that cash and stock targets receive equal dollar premia on subsequent bids. In the last
two columns of Table 6, we control for both previous and contemporaneous target size.
The cash coefficient is again insignificant.23 Note that, in the specification controlling for
previous target size (Columns 1 and 2), the coefficient on the control for time between
bids (10.1% and 5.8%) can be interpreted as the annualized real risk-adjusted discount
rate. By estimating the discount rate, we do not have to impose an appropriate discount
rate on our own. The size of the estimated coefficients is economically sensible.
In sum, we find that future takeovers of cash and stock targets are similar in their
timing and value, suggesting that the revaluation difference pertains to the target’s stand-
alone value. We now analyze whether the changes in stand-alone value can be related to
anticipated changes of operational policies, the catalyst channel.
3.2.2. Change in operational policies
Failed takeover attempts can serve as a catalyst inducing target managers to improve
their operational policies. For example, Safieddine and Titman (1999) report that targets
of failed takeover attempts tend to increase their leverage, especially after hostile bids,
and that such targets with increased leverage exhibit superior operating performance and
are less likely to be taken over in the future.
22 See Appendix Table B.5 for the same analysis in the subsample of pure deals.
23 The much larger magnitude of the contemporaneous-size coefficient, compared with the previous-
size coefficient (both of which add up to roughly one), and the comparison of the R2 across specifications
imply that contemporaneous target size is the relevant reference point, consistent with Schwert (1996).
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The catalyst effect can explain our results if it is stronger for cash than for stock deals.
In light of the analysis of Safieddine and Titman (1999), all of our multivariate regressions,
in particular in Table 4, control for hostility. We then consider the following outcome
variables, which have been used as proxies for operational change in prior literature:
the sum of short-term and long-term debt, employment, capital expenditure, research
and development (R&D) expenses, and—as a proxy for asset sales—the book value of
assets. For each of these outcome variables y, we consider raw changes (∆ log y), changes
scaled by assets A (∆ log(y/A)), and scaled changes relative to the respective matched
control firm (∆T,C∆ log (y/A) = ∆ log(y/A)−∆ log(yC/AC)), from the calendar year-end
before (the year of) deal announcement to the calendar year-end after (the year of) deal
failure.24 For example, for the variable “debt” this reflects total changes in debt, changes
in book leverage, and changes in book leverage relative to the matched control firm.
Table 7 presents our analysis of operational changes along these dimensions for raw
changes (Panel A), changes scaled by assets (Panel B), and scaled changes relative to the
respective matched control firm (Panel C). For both the main and the large sample, the
regressions control for our usual set of firm and deal variables (offer premium, indicator
variables for hostility and tender offer, and q of target). We also include industry and
year fixed effects when we do not subtract the corresponding change in the matched
control firm, as the control firms were matched in part based on those variables. For
ease of exposition, Table 7 reports only the relevant cash coefficients from 26 separate
regressions. Note that, in the specifications with the book value of assets as the dependent
variable (last column), scaling (by assets) is not feasible in a meaningful manner.
[Insert Table 7 near here.]
In 25 of our 26 regression specifications, the cash coefficient is insignificant, suggesting
that no meaningful differences exist in the operational changes between cash and stock
targets. We find only one instance in which the cash coefficient is significant. In the
main sample, targets of cash offers feature a higher growth rate of employment if scaled
by assets. However, this result for employment is neither existent in the large sample nor
robust to the other two definitions of the outcome variable.
In unreported regressions, we also analyze CEO turnover as a possible catalyst out-
come. For example, Mikkelson and Partch (1997) provide evidence of a positive rela-
tion between takeover activity and top-management turnover during the hostile-takeover
wave in the 1980s. Here, we investigate whether the use of cash versus stock in the initial
takeover bid is related to CEO turnover after deal failure. We can analyze this relation
only within the (smaller) set of targets that is covered by the ExecuComp database,
which starts in 1992. We fail to find any indication that failed cash bids are more likely
than failed stock bids to be followed by CEO turnover.
In sum, we cannot detect any post-failure operational differences between cash and
stock targets. It is important to stress that the lack of operational differences does
24 This selection requires survival of the respective companies as a stand-alone entity.
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not imply that the catalyst channel is irrelevant altogether. The result merely states
that the catalyst channel might not be differentially at work for cash and stock targets,
which is the main concern in our analysis. Moreover, our analysis relies on the usual
metrics of operational policies [see, for instance, Safieddine and Titman (1999)] based on
public databases such as Compustat/ExecuComp. Hence, our approach potentially fails
to detect differences in operational policies along dimensions that would require deeper
drilling into managerial decision making at a granular level for a large number of firms.
4. Conclusion
Our paper documents a robust link between revaluation of targets in failed takeover
bids and the medium of exchange. Targets of cash offers typically trade 15% above their
pre-announcement level, whereas targets of stock offers are not revalued on average. We
relate our differential revaluation estimates for cash and stock targets to future takeover
activity, a plausible channel for revaluation (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1983). While we
find strong evidence that targets of failed bids are more likely to receive future takeover
bids than matched control firms for up to eight years post failure, we do not detect any
differential effects for cash and stock targets. Our results imply that the differential
revaluation of cash and stock targets is not a by-product of future takeover activities.
We also cannot detect differential subsequent operational policies between cash and stock
targets. Hence, our findings are most consistent with papers such as Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan (2004), which suggest that the choice of the medium of exchange reveals
information to the market about the stand-alone value of the entities involved.
By ruling in the possibility of information effects of takeover bids, in contrast to
earlier literature, we hope that our results will help to rekindle the classical debate about
the relative importance of information revelation about the target vis-a`-vis real effects
induced by takeover bids. Our evidence suggests that future work in this area ought to
account for the informational implications of the medium of exchange not just on the
bidder side (see Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, and Noah, 2005), but also on the side of the
target.
Appendix A. Methodology
A.1. Linear approximation
The time interval between announcement of the initial bid and failure of the deal
varies across the sample. We normalize this window to relative time, i.e., between tR = 0
and tR = 100%. Suppose a deal has 40 days between announcement and failure, i.e.,
Ti = 40. Then, the cumulative abnormal return after tR = 5% relative time, ĈARi (5%),
is equal to the cumulative abnormal return after 40 · 5% = 2 actual trading days, i.e.,
CARi (tRTi). If tRTi is not an integer number, we use linear interpolation between the
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actual trading days, i.e.,
ĈARi (tR) =
(
1− w(i,tr)
)
CARi (btRTic) + w(i,tr)CARi (btRTic+ 1) , (3)
where bxc refers to the floor function and w(i,tr) = tRTi−btRTic. For example, if Ti = 40
days and tR = 8%, then w(i,tr) = 40 · 8% − b40 · 8%c = 0.2, so that the cumulative
abnormal return after 8% relative time has passed is given by ĈARi (8%) = 0.8CARi (3)+
0.2CARi (4).
A.2. Long-run abnormal returns
Denote the calendar-month return on our post-failure target portfolio by Rp,t. To
calculate the corresponding abnormal returns, we use the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) and run the following regression:
Rp,t −Rf,t = αp + βp(Rm,t −Rf,t) + εp,t, (4)
where Rf,t is the one-month treasury bill rate, Rm,t is the monthly return on the CRSP
value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ broad market index, and αp captures the monthly
abnormal return on the post-failure target portfolio.
We account for the fact that monthly returns with more firms entering the respective
portfolio are more precisely estimated than months with few firms. The residual variance
of portfolio p in month t with Np,t equally weighted firms is given by
V ar (εp,t) = V ar
(∑ 1
Np,t
εi,t
)
=
V ar (εi)
Np,t
+
Np,t − 1
Np,t
ρ¯V ar (εi), (5)
where V ar (εi) is the average residual variance of all stocks and ρ¯ is defined such that
ρ¯V ar (εi) represents the average covariance across all stocks. (Target firms in a given
month are predominantly in similar industries, so that we expect residuals to be positively
correlated.) Because the most important change from month to month concerns the
number of firms, Np,t, variations in V ar (εi) and ρ¯ are second order, so that the variance
of an equal-weight portfolio scales with 1
Np,t
+ Np,t−1
Np,t
ρ¯. Based on the empirical results of
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), we choose ρ¯ = 0.1. We then apply weighted
least squares.
For the long-short portfolio, the monthly variance is given by
V ar (εC,t − εS,t) = V ar (εC,t) + V ar (εS,t)− 2Cov (εC,t, εS,t)
= V ar (εi) (1− ρ¯)
(
1
NC,t
+
1
NS,t
)
. (6)
The second line follows from assuming that cash and stock firms share average residual
variances and average residual covariances. For the long-short portfolio, we thus obtain
that the variance scales with 1
NC,t
+ 1
NS,t
.
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Table 2
Failure categories.
The category “Price too low” denotes failed deals in which the parties could not agree on the
transaction price. “Management rejection” refers to deals that failed because the management
or the board, or both, refused the bid. “Shareholder rejection” indicates rejection by sharehold-
ers, e.g., leading to an insufficient number of shares being tendered. “Target news (public)”
refers to failed deals associated with (good or bad) public news about the target, and “Target
problems (private)” to failed deals in which the acquirer discovered bad information in the due
diligence process. “Market problems” denotes deal failure due to shifting market conditions
(typically stock market plunges), and “Industry problems” are pertinent to the target’s or the
acquirer’s industry, or both. “Regulator” refers to deal failure in which the news search revealed
lack of regulatory approval. “Management terms” describes all failed deals in which acquirer
and target were unable to agree on terms other than the price (e.g., the nomination of a Chief
Executive Officer of the future company). “Bidder problems” summarizes deal cancelations
due to financing problems or other bad news on the part of the bidder. “Bidder acquired”
are sudden cancelations triggered by the acquisition of the bidder. “Alliance” denotes failed
bids after which bidder and target entered into other cooperations. A deal could be assigned
to multiple categories. We denote the sample of bids that were not withdrawn due to news
regarding the target or market or industry problems as sample N ; the results are in Table 4.
We denote the sample containing only bids that were canceled due to regulatory issues, bidder
news, or disagreement on management terms as sample C. The sample “Main” is the main
sample of all unsuccessful bids as defined in Section 2. The column entitled “Average % cash”
shows the average percentage of the transaction value offered in cash. The columns “Cash co-
efficient target” and “Cash coefficient acquirer” show the coefficient estimates from regressing,
respectively, the target’s and the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return from 25 days before
announcement to 25 days after deal failure on the fraction offered in cash and a constant. *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Cash coefficient Cash coefficient
Failure reason Average % cash target acquirer N
Price too low 57.0% 0.241** 0.075 25
Management rejection 57.5% 0.234 0.103 27
Shareholder rejection 66.7% 0.833** 0.241 12
Target news (public) 40.2% 0.489 -0.067 19
Target problems (private) 28.9% 0.084 0.312 8
Market problems 43.3% -0.335 0.616*** 15
Industry problems 29.4% 0.045 0.014 4
Regulator 48.1% 0.321** 0.251** 49
Management terms 33.1% 0.101 0.185 13
Bidder problems 20.6% 0.090 0.787*** 22
Bidder acquired 33.3% 0.789 0.422 3
Alliance 35.9% 0.146 0.247 11
All bids with failure reason 42.4% 0.166* 0.231*** 150
All bids in sample C 39.3% 0.192** 0.347*** 81
All bids (Main) 44.0% 0.224*** 0.127** 236
Table 3
Long-term persistence of cash versus stock revaluation differences.
Capital Asset Pricing Model calendar-time portfolio estimates of alpha (in percent per month)
are based on weighted least squares regressions of monthly premium of portfolio relative to
the one-month Treasury rate (as the dependent variable) on monthly market return, as well as
long-short difference between portfolio returns. We form equal-weight portfolios of targets that
received an unsuccessful pure-cash or pure-stock bid in the previous n years, where n varies
from one to five (across rows). We use the main sample in the first three columns and the
large sample with (also) targets of nonpublic acquirers in the last three columns. Long-short
portfolios go long in cash targets and short in stock targets. N is the number of months with
nonempty portfolios. Observations are weighted as explained in Appendix Section A.2. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
Main sample Large sample
Alpha Cash Stock Long-short Cash Stock Long-short
One year 0.65 0.44 0.21 -0.29 0.61 -1.08
(0.75) (0.71) (1.14) (0.37) (0.61) (0.70)
R2 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.28 0.19 0.02
N 267 275 249 309 290 290
Two years 0.11 0.69 -0.36 0.05 0.65 -0.70
(0.57) (0.55) (0.81) (0.33) (0.46) (0.52)
R2 0.17 0.26 0.01 0.35 0.33 0.04
N 293 290 290 321 293 293
Three years 0.41 0.40 0.27 0.29 0.52 -0.20
(0.53) (0.46) (0.67) (0.29) (0.39) (0.43)
R2 0.19 0.34 0.02 0.42 0.42 0.08
N 293 293 293 330 293 293
Four years 0.48 0.27 0.34 0.26 0.38 -0.06
(0.48) (0.42) (0.60) (0.28) (0.36) (0.39)
R2 0.21 0.38 0.03 0.43 0.45 0.07
N 293 293 293 331 293 293
Five years 0.55 0.42 0.20 0.26 0.51 -0.16
(0.44) (0.40) (0.53) (0.26) (0.35) (0.35)
R2 0.25 0.40 0.03 0.47 0.47 0.08
N 293 293 293 331 293 293
Table 4
Cash versus stock revaluation differences in a controlled regression framework.
The table reports ordinary least squares regressions with target cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) from 25 days before announcement to 25 days after deal failure as the dependent variable.
The sample “Main” consists of all unsuccessful bids in the main sample as defined in Section
2, and the sample “Main, Pure” consists of all unsuccessful pure-cash and pure-stock bids from
the main sample. In the last three columns, we limit the respective samples to bids that were
not withdrawn due to any news regarding the target or market or industry problems (“N”
and “N , Pure”). “Cash” is expressed as a fraction of the total payment (and, hence, equal to
a dummy for cash in the sample of pure deals in the third and sixth column). “Target size”
is the target’s market value of equity in billions of 2010 dollars. “Relative deal size” is the
transaction value over the acquirer’s market value of equity. “Offer premium” is normalized
by the target’s market capitalization at one month prior to the announcement of the bid and
truncated between zero and two. We include indicator variables for whether the bid was hostile
or a tender offer. All non-deal-related variables are measured at the end of the year prior to
the unsuccessful deal’s announcement, and all q variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. Industry fixed effects are based on one-digit Standard Industrial Classification
codes. A constant term is always included in the absence of fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Target CAR (B-25, F+25)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash 0.224*** 0.199** 0.226** 0.244*** 0.195** 0.224**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
Log(Target size) -0.042* -0.067** -0.031 -0.053*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Log(Relative deal size) 0.016 0.023 0.013 0.020
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Offer premium 0.306*** 0.297** 0.358*** 0.350***
(0.11) (0.14) (0.08) (0.09)
Hostile 0.178** 0.075 0.083 -0.005
(0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10)
Tender offer 0.013 0.057 0.015 0.035
(0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13)
q of acquirer 0.033* 0.039* 0.016 0.021
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
q of target -0.011 0.013 -0.003 0.014
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Industry and year No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
fixed effects
Sample Main Main Main, N N N ,
Pure Pure
N 236 236 183 192 192 152
Table 5
Frequency of future takeovers.
This table reports hazard ratios from Cox proportional-hazard regressions estimating the prob-
ability that the target of a failed takeover receives another, successful takeover bid after a failed
bid. The sample “Main” consists of all unsuccessful bids in the main sample as defined in
Section 2, and the sample “Main, Pure” consists of all unsuccessful pure-cash and pure-stock
bids from the main sample. In the third and fifth column, we extend the respective samples to
unsuccessful bids by nonpublic acquirers (“Large” and “Large, Pure”). “Cash” is expressed as
a fraction of the total payment (and, hence, equal to a dummy for cash in the sample of pure
deals in the last two columns). “Target size” is the target’s market value of equity in billions
of 2010 dollars. “Offer premium” is normalized by the target’s market capitalization at one
month prior to the announcement of the bid and truncated between zero and two. We include
an indicator variable for whether the bid was hostile or a tender offer. Target CAR (B − 25,
F + 25) is the cumulative abnormal return from 25 days before announcement until 25 days
after deal failure. All non-deal-related variables are measured at the end of the year prior to
the unsuccessful deal’s announcement, and q of target is winsorized at the 1st and 99th per-
centiles. Industry fixed effects are based on one-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes.
A constant term is always included in the absence of fixed effects. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Successful takeover bid in future
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash 1.106 1.147 0.866 1.513 1.089
(0.22) (0.36) (0.12) (0.63) (0.18)
Log(Target size) 1.058 0.977 1.194* 1.009
(0.08) (0.03) (0.12) (0.04)
Offer premium 1.283 0.739* 0.918 0.702*
(0.38) (0.13) (0.36) (0.14)
Hostile 0.389* 0.776 0.350* 0.642**
(0.19) (0.15) (0.22) (0.14)
Tender offer 1.456 1.091 1.343 1.110
(0.60) (0.23) (0.69) (0.25)
q of target 0.819** 0.847*** 0.737*** 0.857**
(0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06)
Target CAR (B − 25, F + 25) 0.732 1.088 1.094 1.278
(0.19) (0.17) (0.40) (0.24)
Industry and year No Yes Yes Yes Yes
fixed effects
Sample Main Main Large Main, Large,
Pure Pure
N 236 236 675 183 518
Table 6
Value of future takeover bids.
The table reports ordinary least squares regressions of the value of next takeover bid (log in
billions of 2010 dollars) following a failed takeover bid for the same target as the dependent
variable. The sample “Main*” consists of all unsuccessful bids in the main sample as defined in
Section 2 that were followed by a successful takeover bid for the same target, conditional on the
availability of the dollar value of the next offer. The sample “Large*” also includes nonpublic
acquirers. “Cash” is expressed as a fraction of the total payment. “Previous (contemporaneous)
target size” is the target’s market value of equity in billions of 2010 dollars one month prior to
the previous unsuccessful (next) bid’s announcement. “Offer premium” is normalized by the
target’s market capitalization at one month prior to the announcement of the bid and truncated
between zero and two. We include an indicator variable for whether the bid was hostile and
for tender offers, and we control for the years passed between the two deal announcements
under consideration (“Years between”). The target’s q ratio is measured at the end of the year
prior to the unsuccessful deal’s announcement and is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Industry fixed effects are based on one-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
Log(next offer value)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash ∈ [0, 1] 0.040 0.112 -0.111 -0.037 -0.102 -0.028
(0.24) (0.13) (0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
Log(Prev. target size) 0.937*** 0.921*** 0.072** 0.062**
(0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Log(Cont. target size) 0.968*** 0.972*** 0.916*** 0.924***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Offer premium 0.675*** 0.744*** 0.233*** 0.027 0.272*** 0.077
(0.23) (0.21) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
Hostile -0.185 0.216 0.180* 0.061 0.140 0.054
(0.40) (0.17) (0.10) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05)
Tender offer 0.015 0.194 -0.049 0.027 -0.035 0.038
(0.27) (0.18) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05)
q of target -0.139 -0.029 -0.017 -0.013 -0.030 -0.019
(0.08) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Years between 0.101*** 0.058*** -0.008 -0.000 -0.004 0.001
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Industry and year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
fixed effects
Sample Main* Large* Main* Large* Main* Large*
N 99 254 99 254 99 254
R2 0.850 0.818 0.988 0.984 0.988 0.984
Adjusted R2 0.766 0.785 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.982
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to
Target Revaluation after Failed Takeover Attempts –
Cash versus Stock
by Ulrike Malmendier, Marcus M. Opp, and Farzad Saidi
Appendix B. Long-run returns with forward-looking sample selection
In this section, we explore what one can learn from the analysis of long-run abnormal
returns conditional on future takeover activities, i.e., when firms are sorted into groups
based on takeover bids they receive in the future. In particular, we ask whether condi-
tioning on not receiving any future takeover bid helps to better identify the effect of the
(initial) failed bid on the target’s stand-alone value. Such conditional long-run analysis
mirrors the approach in the seminal paper by Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983), who ana-
lyze targets of failed bids that do not receive a takeover offer in the five years after deal
failure.25
First, we consider the biases involved in conditioning on the absence of future bids.
Long-run returns in such a sample capture the joint effect of the failed takeover attempt
and of the absence of future bids. As a result, the long-run returns (starting from before
the announcement of the failed bid) are downward-biased estimates of the effect of the
failed bid on the target’s stand-alone value. This is because the ex-ante market price
incorporates that the firm will be taken over with positive probability at some point
over the next years, but the sample construction implies zero – i.e., abnormally low –
successful takeover activity. This is the relevant bias affecting the analysis of Bradley,
Desai, and Kim (1983).
Note that the nature of the bias depends on the goal of the conditional analysis. For
example, if the objective was to estimate the effect of the permanent disappearance of a
takeover bid – i.e., to estimate the loss of target value as the takeover probability goes
from almost 100% to 0% – then identifying a sample in which future takeover activity is
eliminated (to 0%) as in Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) is warranted.26 However, such
an analysis of long-run returns starting from the post-announcement target value would
be affected by a different bias, with the opposite sign, because the post-announcement
target value reflects that the probability of success is strictly less than 100%. This is
because a rational market will anticipate the possibility of deal failure (over 11% of all
deals fail, cf. Panel A of Table 1). As a result, long-run returns conditional on the
absence of a future takeover reflect a decrease in takeover probability of less than 100%,
implying that these long-run returns are an upward-biased measure of the “permanent”
disappearance of the bid.
Returning to the objective of our analysis, i.e., to measure the effect of a failed bid
on target valuation, the approximate magnitude of the bias is easy to gauge. As we show
in the empirical analysis in the main paper, 20% of matched control firms are taken over
within 5 years. Assuming an average takeover premium of 46.2% (cf. Panel A of Table
1), conditioning on the absence of any future bid over the next five years, produces a
bias of roughly 46.2% · 0.2 ≈ 9%. This ballpark estimate overstates the bias somewhat
since it ignores discounting. In what follows, we propose two approaches to assess the
25 The content of this section heavily benefited from comments by Harry DeAngelo, our referee.
26 Here, absence of a takeover attempt over a five-year horizon proxies for the permanent absence of
future bids.
magnitude of the bias more precisely, including the effect of discounting.
Theoretical calculation of bias in constant-growth-model. First, we employ a constant-
growth model of stand-alone cash flows with a growth-adjusted discount rate of r¯. The
(admittedly strong) assumptions of constant growth and an all-equity firm allow us to
obtain intuitive expressions. Let λ denote the (exponential) arrival rate of takeover
attempts and pi the takeover premium paid over the prevailing market price. Then, the
unconditional stock-market value of a firm, VU , is:
VU =
1
r¯ − λpi . (1)
Here, the expected yearly premium λpi accounts for growth due to future takeover activity.
The value of a firm conditional on not being taken over for T years is:
V (T ) =
(
1− e−r¯T ) 1
r¯
+ e−r¯T
1
r¯ − λpi . (2)
Intuitively, this conditional value is a weighted average of the stand-alone value, 1
r¯
, and
the unconditional value, VU . The larger T the greater the weight on the stand-alone
value. Combining the two equations, the look-ahead bias of conditioning on the absence
of takeover activity for T years, ∆ = V (T )−VU
VU
, is given by:
∆ = −λpi
r¯
(
1− e−r¯T ) < 0. (3)
To obtain an estimate for the magnitude of the bias if one conditions on the absence of
takeover activity for T = 5 years, we choose λ = 4.1% per year. This is the empirical
estimate for matched control firms, i.e., firms that look like actual targets just before
the latter receive a (failed) takeover attempt. We choose pi = 46.2% and set r¯ = 6%.
The resulting bias is −8.2% of firm value, an economically significant look-ahead bias,
and similar in magnitude to the ballpark estimate above. We note that the bias is fairly
insensitive to the choice of the growth-adjusted discount rate. For r¯ = 4%, we obtain an
bias of −8.6%, whereas r¯ = 8% produces a bias of −7.8%. Subtracting the (negative)
bias allows us, under the modeling assumptions, to retrieve the unbiased estimate.
We note that our actual sample construction in the main paper also implies a small
conditioning bias. We require that there be no announcement of another bid by the time
of failure. Hence, our sample is restricted to firms that are not taken over for, on average,
60 trading days (the average time from announcement to failure, see Panel B of Table
1). For the conditioning horizon of T = 60/250 years, the estimated bias is −0.45%.
Hence, this bias is orders of magnitude smaller. Most importantly, this bias should apply
equally to cash and stock targets and should, thus, not affect our differential results. We
note that restricting ourselves to deals failing in a short amount of time (less than 250
trading days) limits the magnitude of the bias.
Empirical estimation. In order to estimate the bias empirically, without relying on functional-
form assumptions, we consider two subsamples of firms. Subsample 1 consists of firms
receiving a takeover bid that ultimately fails, and that do not receive a bid in the sub-
sequent five years. Subsample 2 consists of matched control firms that do not receive a
bid over the same period. The estimates for the second subsample capture the empirical
bias inherent in estimating long-run returns for the first subsample. Subtracting the bias
from the estimated returns in Subsample 1, we would obtain the unbiased estimate of
the (stand-alone) value implications of a takeover bid.
While this approach is conceptually superior to employing the constant-growth model
in that it does not rely on functional form assumptions, it is hard to implement in practice.
The “ballpark” estimate of an 8% bias over five years suggests that we would need to
statistically detect abnormal returns of −1.6% p.a., which is implausible given stock-
market noise. For completeness we implement the approach empirically nevertheless.
For each failed bid in the large sample between January 1980 and December 2003, we
determine whether the respective target and its control firm are not taken over within
five years. (The sample of failed bids ends in December 2003 due to the forward-looking
selection criterion.) For example, Oneida Limited received a takeover bid from Libbey,
which failed in July 1999. Since Oneida did not receive a subsequent successful takeover
bid until June 2004, it would be considered “not taken over.” To calculate the perfor-
mance of targets that have not been taken over, we rely on the calendar-time-portfolio
methods (see Appendix A.2), now applied to this subset of targets. Thus, continuing with
our example from above, Oneida is included in the 60-month portfolio between August
1999 and December 2003, its last month as a listed company.
We obtain the following results for abnormal returns:
1. Long-run returns for actual targets post failure conditional on not being taken
over for 5 years. All alpha estimates are insignificant.
(a) Cash targets: 0.14% p.a.
(b) Stock targets: 0.69% p.a.
2. Long-run returns for matched control firms conditional on not being taken over
for 5 years. All alpha estimates insignificant.
(a) Matched firms of cash targets: -1.87% p.a.
(b) Matched firms of stock targets: 2.8% p.a.
(c) All matched firms (cash + stock + hybrid): -0.57% p.a.
Hence, the analysis of the post-failure returns does not reject the hypothesis that these
portfolios have normal returns. We also see that the return estimates are rather noisy.
For example, the 95% confidence interval for the yearly alpha of the matched control
firms ranges from −6.67% to 5.54%. We can neither reject the hypothesis that the bias
estimate of -0.57% p.a. is equal to the conceptual bias of −1.6% per year, nor that
it is zero. In short, while the sample-selection bias (over 5 years) can be economically
meaningful, i.e., around 8% of the equity value, the noise in long-run returns analyses is
orders of magnitude larger.
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Table B.2
Determinants of cash offers.
OLS regressions with the medium of exchange as the dependent variable. The sample Main
consists of all unsuccessful bids in the main sample as defined in Section 2, the sample Main,
Pure of all unsuccessful pure-cash and pure-stock bids from the main sample. Cash is expressed
as a fraction of the total payment (and hence equal to a dummy for cash in the sample of pure
deals in the last three columns). Target size is the target’s market value of equity in 2010
$bn. Relative deal size is the transaction value over the acquirer’s market value of equity.
Offer premium is normalized by the target’s market capitalization at one month prior to the
announcement of the bid, and truncated between 0 and 2. We include indicator variables for
whether the bid was hostile or a tender offer. Experienced acquirers (dummy variable) have
attempted (successfully or not) at least ten acquisitions in the five years up to the year of the
takeover bid in question. All non-deal-related variables are measured at the end of the year
prior to the unsuccessful deal’s announcement, and all q variables are winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles. Industry fixed effects are based on one-digit SIC codes. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. */**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level, respectively.
Cash ∈ [0, 1] Cash ∈ {0, 1}
Log(target size) 0.005 -0.006 0.009 -0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(rel. deal size) -0.056*** -0.065*** -0.051*** -0.070*** -0.079*** -0.061***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Offer premium 0.009 -0.025
(0.02) (0.03)
Hostile 0.141** 0.183**
(0.06) (0.07)
Tender offer 0.474*** 0.529***
(0.02) (0.02)
q of acquirer -0.030*** -0.022*** -0.030*** -0.022***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
q of target -0.033*** -0.022*** -0.039*** -0.024***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Exp. acquirer 0.000 -0.015 -0.006 -0.018 -0.036 -0.019
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
% of target sought -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Industry & year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample Main Main Main Main, Main, Main,
Pure Pure Pure
2,082 2,082 2,082 1,451 1,451 1,451
Table B.3
Cash vs. stock revaluation differences in a controlled regression framework – large sample.
OLS regressions with target CAR from 25 days before announcement to 25 days after deal
failure as the dependent variable. The sample Large consists of all unsuccessful bids, including
those by non-public acquirers, in the large sample as defined in Section 2; the sample Large,
Pure of all unsuccessful pure-cash and pure-stock bids, including those by non-public acquirers,
from the large sample. Cash is expressed as a fraction of the total payment (and hence equal
to a dummy for cash in the sample of pure deals in the last two columns). Target size is the
target’s market value of equity in 2010 $bn. Offer premium is normalized by the target’s market
capitalization at one month prior to the announcement of the bid, and truncated between 0
and 2. We include indicator variables for whether the bid was hostile or a tender offer. All
non-deal-related variables are measured at the end of the year prior to the unsuccessful deal’s
announcement, and all q variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Industry fixed
effects are based on one-digit SIC codes. A constant term is always included in the absence of
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** denote significance at the
10%/5%/1% level, respectively.
Target CAR (B-25, F+25)
Cash 0.108** 0.077* 0.144*** 0.114**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Log(target size) -0.030** -0.037**
(0.01) (0.01)
Offer premium 0.299*** 0.306***
(0.06) (0.07)
Hostile 0.123*** 0.121***
(0.04) (0.04)
Tender offer 0.146*** 0.188***
(0.05) (0.06)
q of target -0.010 0.013
(0.02) (0.02)
Industry & year FE N Y N Y
Sample Large Large Large, Large,
Pure Pure
N 675 675 518 518
Table B.4
Returning bidders – summary.
This table summarizes facts about returning bidders after initial failed bids for the same target
(but before the end of the data set in 2008). We consider the main sample in the first two
columns, and extend to the large sample, including bids by non-public acquirers, in the last two
columns. Time to next bid is in calendar days.
Main sample Large sample
Number of observations 236 675
Received subsequent bid 134 409
Successful Failed Successful Failed
101 33 262 147
Subsequent bids by returning bidders 15 4 40 28
Average time to next bid by returning bidder 539.7 604.5 581.7 688.1
Table B.5
Value of future takeover bid – pure deals.
OLS regressions of the value of next takeover bid (log in 2010 $bn) following a failed takeover
bid for the same target as the dependent variable. The sample Main*, Pure consists of all
unsuccessful pure-cash and pure-stock bids from the main sample (as defined in Section 2) that
were followed by a successful takeover bid for the same target, conditional on the availability of
the dollar value of the next offer. The sample Large*, Pure also includes non-public acquirers.
Cash is equal to a dummy indicating 100% cash, rather than 100% stock, as the method of
payment. Previous (contemporaneous) target size is the target’s market value of equity in 2010
$bn one month prior to the previous unsuccessful (next) bid’s announcement. Offer premium
is normalized by the target’s market capitalization at one month prior to the announcement
of the bid, and truncated between 0 and 2. We include an indicator variable for whether the
bid was hostile and for tender offers, and control for the years passed between the two deal
announcements under consideration (Years between). The target’s q ratio is measured at the
end of the year prior to the unsuccessful deal’s announcement, and is winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentiles. Industry fixed effects are based on one-digit SIC codes. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. */**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level, respectively.
Log(next offer value)
Cash ∈ [0, 1] 0.077 0.134 -0.039 -0.041 -0.019 -0.028
(0.27) (0.15) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
Log(prev. target size) 1.059*** 0.929*** 0.197*** 0.111***
(0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Log(cont. target size) 0.968*** 0.977*** 0.842*** 0.890***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Offer premium 0.869** 0.734*** 0.271** -0.000 0.388*** 0.094
(0.35) (0.19) (0.12) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08)
Hostile -0.874 0.378** 0.109 0.071 -0.154 0.076
(0.57) (0.18) (0.15) (0.06) (0.12) (0.05)
Tender offer 0.018 0.073 -0.096 0.036 -0.058 0.039
(0.32) (0.19) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
q of target -0.240* -0.041 -0.009 -0.021 -0.069 -0.035*
(0.12) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Years between 0.060* 0.033* -0.017 -0.000 -0.007 0.000
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Industry & year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample Main*, Large*, Main*, Large*, Main*, Large*,
Pure Pure Pure Pure Pure Pure
N 73 185 73 185 73 185
R2 0.867 0.852 0.984 0.981 0.988 0.983
Adjusted R2 0.749 0.816 0.969 0.977 0.976 0.979
